Dornier Bombers – Warbirds fotofax

Introduction
The development of the Luftwaffe began in secret much earlier than 1933, the date often quoted;
by that year, German companies had already built aircraft in Sweden and Switzerland, thanks to the full co-operation offered by the governments of those countries.
Dornier, together with Junkers, played an important role in the raising of the new air arm, notably by means of its aero-engines produced on the shores of Lake Constance.
Under the guise of civil transports, many potential bomber aircraft were developed, and many raw crewmen were given valuable experience in long-range, bad-weather and night flying with the Reichsbahn (German Railways).
During the early 1930s new aircraft such as the Do 11, Do 13 and Do 23 helped to establish the first Kampfgruppen of the Luftwaffe - which later became the famous Kampfgeschwader.
The writings of Generals Giulio Douhet and William ('Billy')Mitchell, together with the experiences of the Spanish Civil War, pointed the way to the practical uses to which a well-armed bomber might be put.
However, the Luftwaffe's High Command did not learn the same lessons as others and remained to be convinced of the attributes of the four-engined strategic bomber;
as a result, only one Do 19 was ever built, and this was never flown by a front-line unit.
Instead, Germany concentrated her resources on building a number of high-speed medium bombers:
as well as the He 111, there was the Do 17 and the modified Do 17Z - otherwise known as the Do 215 - which went into action early in the war.
Together with the Ju 88, a developed Do 17, the Do 217, was built in large quantities, offering improved capabilities and performance.
It was the Do 217 which carried the main burden of the offensive air war in Western Europe with Kampfgeschwader (KG) 2, 3 and 77;
theDo277E version brought nightly terror to the British people from 1941 to 1944.
The Do 217 crews experimented continually with new weapons systems, guided missiles and bombs.
The aircraft proved their capabilities over moderate distances but suffered painful losses during anti-shipping raids over the Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic Ocean and English Channel.
Once Germany had lost her air superiority, the front-line bomber units sustained much more serious attrition, and, partly as a result of this, the 'Bomber B' programme and the Arbeitsflugzeu (the Dornier Do 317 and 477) failed.
For their assistance with data and photographs for this volume, I should like to express my thanks to Direktor Patt and his helpful team at Dornier GmbH, Munich;
Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG; and Messrs Attonen, Balke, Chapman, Creek,
Dabrowski, Dressel, Lutz, Menke, Nowarra, Sangier, Seebra, Seebrandt, Selinger,
Sengfelder, Schliepharke, Spork, Stapfer, H and O. Thiele and, finally, Mr Weirich.

Manfred Griehl