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    Flying the F-104

    vanni
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    Numero di messaggi : 17
    Data d'iscrizione : 30.06.10
    Età : 57

    Flying the F-104 Empty Flying the F-104

    Messaggio  vanni Mer Set 22, 2010 3:51 pm

    (Tratto da: Lockeed F-104 Starfighter di Martin W. Bowman - Crowood Aviation Series)


    Takeoff was child's play.
    You engaged nosewheel steering and plugged in the afterburner, which gave a smooth, positive light in seven stages.
    The stick was just held in the neutral position until approximately 20-25 knots below the computed takeoff speed when back pressure was applied. From then on, flight was (usually) inevitable.
    Throttle response was truly awesome.
    Unlike some other jet aircraft, fuel control units metered JP-4 to engine and afterburner such that you never had to worry about over-temping the engine, the net result being that you could bang the throttle around as much as you wanted.
    A real stop-go lever.
    Also, unlike today's high bypass engines, spool-up time was very rapid; the resulting thrust changes instantaneous.
    The power was thus always there when you needed it, and this was a
    tremendous advantage when flying close formation, and also for making rapid corrections to airspeed in any phas of flight where this was required, such as in the landing pattern or when dropping bombs, where speed accuracy is vital.
    Often, today's bypass engines produce significant delays from throttle movement to engine response, a condition that requires some forethought ro compensate for on the part of the pilot.
    This was cerrainly not a problem with the 104.
    I personally had the relatively unique experience of flying the jet in both temperature extremes, starting with three years as an instructor (after a long rour in Germany) in Cold Lake, Canada, where we had square tyres and -40°F weather for weeks on end in winter. We used ro joke that we had eleven months of winter and one month of bad skiing, but it wasn't far from the truth.
    The good news was the remarkable effect the cold air had on jet engines.
    One of the parallel runways at Cold Lake is 12,OOOft long, and I can remember that on afterburner takeoff on a -40°F day in a 'clean' (no external stores) aircraft, you could have 450kt on the clock by the end of the runway.
    The most difficult part was getting the landing gear locked up by its limiting speed of 260kt after takeoff.
    If you hesitated even a second after nosewheel rotation, you were going to get an overspeed.
    In marked contrast to this experience were memories of operations in the Arizona desert as an exchange instrucror at the USAF/GAF Fighter Weapons School.
    Over the years, I suppose I've flown just about every configuration the 104 has to offer, but as an antithesis to the clean jet in the wintertime Cold Lake, the dart-tow ship in summertime Phoenix springs ro mind.
    This consisted of two wingtip tanks, a wing pylon tank and the dart rig itself, a cumbersome target device that looked like a huge foil paper airplane that was reeled out in flight under the left wing. On a 140°F runway temperature day, the takeoff roll was spectacular and guaranteed to make a devout Christian out of even the most practised atheist.
    You can joke about your 'gravel sniffers in the nose' to sense nosewheel rotation time; this situation really called for it.
    I'll never forget that tyre fail speed was 239kt and at that temperature and configuration, takeoff speed was around 235.
    The jet ended up clawing her way inro the air, waging a personal war with Sir Isaac Newron for every inch of altitude gained.
    It was always a near thing and happiness was staggering away into the heavy summer desert air with the gear safely tucked up and the runway behind you.
    All this for the privilege of letting someone shoot at you.
    Landing was alway an impressive, though usually straightforward event.
    The approach speed were fast by anybody's standards, but you got used to the speed just like anything else.
    Normal landing configuration was with LAND (full) flap selected, and a long, flat final approach was flown at 175-180kt with touchdown at 155-160 minimum.
    To the these basic speeds were added extra knots for any fuel over 1,000Ib, crosswinds, gusty winds, external stores, mother, wife, kids and so on. In short, it was not at all unusual to add 20kt to the basic speeds.
    Boundary Layer ontrol (BLC) was added to the razor wings to lower landing approach and touchdown speeds with LAND flap selected. Because the BLC was only effective down to about 2 per cent engine rpm, the aircraft was unusual in that it was routinely landed with power on.
    When instructing, we threatened dire consequences to the novice who pulled the power to idle prior to touchdown, since this would result in an abrupt loss of both BLC and lift, usually on one wing before the other, and at best, a bone-jarring arrival on the runway.
    In reality, as long as the pilot smoothly and slowly reduced power to idle, there was no controllability problem.
    Landing pattern could also be flown with TAKEOFF (half) flap configuration at slightly higher approach speeds than LAND flap, but BLC roll-off was not a factor to worry about.
    A flapless landing, however, was both an emergency and a memorable experience, especially at night.
    Final approach/touchdown minimum speeds were 230/195kt respectively, plus additives.
    You flew a long flat final where you were going like a scalded cat and felt like you were continuously on the ragged edge of disaster. Descent rate was around 800ft per minute and we tended to fly final on a combination of both airspeed and angle-of-attack (AOA) indications.
    I remember very distinctly a caution Pilot's notes that sternly warned at no time to allow the rate of descent on a flapless approach to exceed more than 2,000ft per minute as recovery would require more than 400ft of altitude.
    In all cases, the aircraft was landed with crab on, and you just kicked it straight with nosewheel steering on the post-landing roll.
    As you can well imagine, increased stopping power was highly desirable and provision was made for this with a big 16t diameter drag chute and an excellent anti-skid braking system.
    If the e didn't work, or we had a takeoff emergency or a slippery runway, we had an arrester hook mounted under the aft fuselage that snagged a cable at the end of the runway. And if that didn't work, well then it really wasn't your day.
    We almost never attempted aerodynamic braking. After all, how efficiently can you aerodynamically brake a pencil?
    Stalls and spins were another flight area approached with great caution.
    Due to the aerodynamics of the high 'T' tail, the aircraft was prone to a phenomenon known as pitch-up at high AOAs.
    Beyond a certain point, this pitch-up was uncontrollable and resulted in severe gyration (or even tructural failure) of the aircraft and a large loss in altitude before recovery to level flight.
    It was possible to develop stall angle of attack very readily and rapidly during abrupt manoeuvres, even though relatively small amounts of stabilizer were used.
    In supersonic flight, the usual stall warnings were inadequate to prevent excessive AOA and an Automatic Pitch Control (APC) was therefore provided which initiated corrective action at the proper time to prevent reaching an AOA high enough to cause pitch-up under any operating condition.
    These warning took the form of a stick shaker and a kicker, which abruptly kicked the stick forward.
    It was, in effect, both a built-in buffet warning and an artificial tall that occurred ahead of the aerodynamic stall.
    Stalls were never practised to completion; recovery action was initiated at either shaker or kicker action, depending on configuration, and stalls were never practised below 25,000ft GL.
    Spins were violent, gut-wrenching manoeuvres and intentional pinning was prohibited.
    A friend of mine had a wild ride one day when one of the main landing gear doors accidentally deployed in supersonic flight during air combat practice.
    Although he executed a brilliant recovery, the thrill factor was so high that it was several minutes before he was capable of coherent speech.
    Because of the jet's rather awesome out-of-control characteristic, pilots generally developed a phobia about flying slow in it at all. At the Weapon chool, I would routinely demonstrate a confidence zoom to zero airspeed.
    Actually, it was perfectly safe under pre-ordained conditions of centre of gravity and fuel weight.
    The trick was to recover very gently, using a very conservative maximum reading on the APC gauge, and rolling the aircraft towards the nearest horizon.
    Ailerons were very effective well past the stall. In reality, if the pilot were just to take his hands off the controls in the vertical stall condition, the aircraft generally knew what it wanted to do better than the pilot did, and would usually recover to a recognizable flight attitude from which a full recovery could be easily made.
    This would not want to be done low to the ground though.
    Altitude losses in out-of-control situations in the 104 were formidable.
    For example, ejection was a checklist procedure if recovery was not effected by 15,000ft AGL.
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    Numero di messaggi : 17
    Data d'iscrizione : 30.06.10
    Età : 57

    Flying the F-104 Empty The losses mount

    Messaggio  vanni Mer Set 22, 2010 5:00 pm

    (Tratto da: Lockeed F-104 Starfighter di Martin W. Bowman - Crowood Aviation Series)

    In Luftwaffe and MarinefIieger service the Starfighter soon got a poor reputation due to a large number of accidents. By 1965, all NATO Consortium pilots were training in northern Germany, but F-104 accidents began to occur on an increasing scale. They are recalled by Wolfgang Czaia, who had graduated in the in 1962 as 'Outstanding Student' and 'Top Gun' at the Fighter Weapons school at Luke AFB, and who flew Republic F-84F Thunderstreaks assigned to JaboG34 at Memmingen for two years. In 1964 JaboG34 transitioned to the F-104G and Czaia checked out in november that year. He recalls:
    "... Many problems with the 104 in the early days were mainly due to the shallow learning curve that maintenance was on. They had to get used to a rather sophisticated technology, and were not able to provide the pilots with the flight hours necessary to build efficiency... "
    According to the February 1966 issue of "Flying Review International":
    "... Much concern is being evinced over the inordinately high Luftwaffe loss rate of F-104 Starfighters - some 60 have now been lost in accidents, including 25 last year ... Contributory factors include poor maintenance due to the Luftwaffe's acute shortage of skilled technicians, and the inexperience of German pilots who have been averaging only fifteen hours per month, with a consequent Loss of proficiency. "
    Wolfgang Czaia adds:
    "... For pilots returning from the US, the 104 was their first operational assignment. Most of these guys had never been inside a cloud! They'd always flown in beautiful weather in both Texas and Arizona, and faced radically different conditions in the rather restricted and geographically small airspace of Germany. Even though they went through a 40-hour 'Europeanization' programme at Luftwaffe Weapons School 10 at Jever, they lacked the experience of their Canadian, Italian, Belgian, and Dutch counterparts, who needed to accumulate at least 1,000 hours in operational jets before being even eligible to check out in the F104. By 1966 the accident rate was unusually high, and a lot of it was wheather-related. Quite often small technical problems would - due to the pilots' inexperience and lack of proficiency - be the trigger for chain reactions resulting in accidents. Once the wings began flying steadily and pilots were getting the required flight time the accident rate dropped to 'normal' (ten accidents per 100,000 flight hours) - but the public still perceivcd it as a dangerous machine, with names like the Witwenmacher ('Widow Maker') or Fliegender Sarg ('Flying Coffin'). Compounding the problem was that every subsequent ground or flight accident continued to make major headlines. We had just as many accidents in F-84s and F-86s, bur these stories would be buried on page 3 or 4..."
    By 7 December 1967 the Luftwaffe had lost 73 F-104s, and 42 pilots and crew killed (including one MFG2 pilot in a Canadian built, USAF-owned F-104G). Between 4 April 1968 and 12 November 1970, a further twenty-six German pilots and crew (21 Luftwaffe personnel and five Marineflieger crew) lost their lives in fifty-two (45 Luftwaffe/seven Marineflieger) Starfighter accidents. All told, by April 1989, the Luftwaffe and Marineflieger combined had lost, or had written off, 292 Starfighters, with l20 pilots and crew killed. (Also, eight USAF instructor pilots died flying Luftwaffe F-104s, 19 June 1962 to 1 July 1975). Twenty-three Marineflieger pilots and crew were killed in the period l8 March 1965 to 17 October 1984. One of these, on 10 March 1979, was Oblt zur see Joachim von Hassel of MFG2, the only son of Herr Kai-Uwe von Hassel, president of the Bonn parliament. It was von Hassel who had been Defence Minister at the height of the public outcry in West Germany at the rate of F-l04 losses when they had reached one a week. At that time the minister had tried to reassure everyone, saying that he considered the Starfighter a safe aircraft, and that he had no reservations abollt his son flying it. Lieutenant Robert Hummel, a US Navy pilot on exchange duty with MFG2 at Eggebeck, had a narrow escape from a Starfighter on 10 July 1984 as he recalled later:
    "... The Starfighter - a beautiful and sleek machine twenty design years ahead of her time. She could seduce you with her speed, transitioning to hyperspace in a heartbeat. It was the opportunity of a lifetime: NATO exchange duty with a German F-104G squadron in Europe for two
    and a half years. As the only naval aviator in the country, I rapidly achieved the qualifications and experience to fly the F/RF-104G throughout the entire operational envelope and was designated 'full combat ready'. The tactical training opportunities in central Europe are unparalleled. The air below 9,OOOft belongs to the military, with relatively few operating restrictions. And then there were the Baltic Sea and north Sea operating areas in Ivan's backyard. It was some of the best flying I've ever experienced. Following final checks, we taxied onto runway 01 in left echelon for a formation go. The tower gave take-off clearance, reporting the winds out of the west at 10 to 15 knots. Engine run-ups and control wipeouts were completed, followed by a thumbs-up from my wingman. I gave the signal to release brakes and light the burner. During this transition phase of engine operation, the nozzle opens up prior to the afterburner igniting and results in a notable loss of thrust for one to three seconds. On this section take-off, my wingman had a quick burner light; I had a slow one. As a result, he ended up acute and accelerating further in front of the lead. It seemed safer to pass him the lead and assume a wing position than have him attempt to reestablish himself in the wing position. I never thought of aborting. So, a positive lead change was executed in the first 1,000ft to the take-off roll. If I had known then what I know now, I would have aborted and saved a beautiful expensive aircraft. Although I was established in an acceptable wing position at rotation, I was on the down-wind side of the formation. The F-104 generates tremendous circulation about the wingtips during take-offs and landings, and the vortices are often visible. Immediately after becoming airborne it became all too clear thar things were not quite right. A high-speed abort now was out of the question since the aircraft was already rolling through 10 degrees angle of bank to the left and into my lead. While I held right stick and full right rudder, my starfighter hesitated for a moment as if the worst was over. Then the left wing began to drop rapidly.
    It was time to jettison the reusable container, and I pulled the lower handle of the Martin-Baker MK-GQ7-A ejection seat with my left hand. The aircraft continued to roll and drift as I waited for the eternity of 0.4 seconds to click off. In 30 to 40 degrees angle of bank, at an altitude of maybe six feet, the roll reversed violently to the right. The canopy was gone, but I was still in the aircraft. I think that the left wingtip had impacted the runway. A cartwheeling explosion had to follow in the very next instant as the wing
    was ripped off. If only I had initiated ejection earlier! If only I had aboned when I first detected the lack of roll control after rotation! I heard the roar of the ejection seat rockets and felt the acceleration as I was catapulted clear of my lost craft. I was now an ejection statistic (the 5,338th life saved by a Martin-Baker seat). The seat worked perfectly, giving me about half a swing before landing dead centre on the runway. From initial aircraft rotation to nylon landing was about ten seconds. The crosswind dragged me across the runway about 50ft until I managed to release my chute. I just lay there on the runway for a moment, waiting for it to start hurting somewhere, then initiated a functional check of the major body parts. They were all still attached: I was, in fact, uninjured. The same could not be said for Starfighter 23+18. She was a twisted mass of fire and metal about a quarter mile away; her flames were being suppressed by the quickly responding crash crew. She became the 19lst tarfighter to crash, and it wasn't her fault.
    In retrospect, the take-off should have been aborted when the non-notice lead change occurred. Speeds are slow, and control of the aircraft is easily maintained. The effects of wingtip vortices cannot be underestimated. Whether during formation or flight leader separation take-offs, sufficient wingtip-to-wingtip separation must be maintained to ensure avoidance of the vortices, which can wrestle control of your aircraft out of your hands in the blink of an eye.
    Know the performance capabilities and characteristics of your aircraft. There are very few aircraft that don't give ample indications of impending departure from controlled flight.
    Know these indications and listen out for them when you are operating at or near the edge of the performance envelope. Know when it's time to jettison the reusable container. The best time to think about ejection situations is in the ready room or at mid-rats with some of your squadron mates. "

      La data/ora di oggi è Ven Nov 22, 2024 11:47 pm